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Editorial: Twentieth-Century Music – Plural
Difference is among the twentieth century’s most volatile legacies to the twenty-first. Over
this period it has increasingly lodged itself in our cultural consciousness, as both theoretical
concept and lived experience. Its workings are refracted through culture (through phenom-
ena such as music) and the way we contemplate and study it (through a journal such as this).
A Brief History of Difference, at least the chapter relevant to the present story, might start in
the early part of the last century with Ferdinand de Saussure’s courses on linguistics. Not only
language, but potentially all signifying phenomena, Saussure argued, articulate the world for
us by cutting it into units (e.g. phonemes, concepts, words, signs) that carry meaning
precisely through being differentiated from one another: reality is rendered as a system of
mutually conditioning differences. By mid-century these ideas had become decisive for
literary and cultural theory under the banner of structuralism and semiotics, in which even a
cultural practice such as fashion could be seen to signify as a system of difference. With the
rise of poststructuralism and deconstruction, difference (or différance) was again seminal in
debates about the very nature of meaning, which in turn informed later twentieth-century
cultural politics of class and society, gender and sexuality, race and ethnicity. (As we know, all
these movements would also in the end, and no less contentiously, make their mark on
musicology.) Most recently – in terms far from academic – cultural difference has moved
into the foreground of global consciousness with the literally shattering and explosive events
of our new century.
Is it going too far to invoke this politically conditioned history as a background to (or
frame around) the contents of a scholarly music journal? The resonances are there. twentieth-
century music could have settled for comfortable retrospective musings on a high modernist
or avant garde repertory, tidily demarcated by the calendar. Instead it has chosen not to
‘exclude any style/genre/category/use of twentieth-century music’ – as Christopher Mark
and Allan Moore put it in their inaugural editorial. And so it is hoped that ‘the contiguity of
divergent topics in each issue . . . will stimulate the creation of new perspectives’.1 Through a
policy of non-exclusion and its openness to diversity, the journal can be seen, then, positively
to embrace difference, and this is certainly in evidence in the following pages. Alongside
investigations of composers and works from the modernist canon there are studies of the
poetics of film music and the consumption of world music. (Plans to include an article on
popular music, which would have made for still greater variegation, had to be shelved for this
issue, owing to the vicissitudes of an already over-running production schedule; but the
commitment to the vernacular as an essential part of twentieth-century music remains, and
will, we hope, emerge as a conspicuous part of the journal’s profile over future issues.) Also
salient in the present issue is the range of modes and methodologies of enquiry, amounting
to a snapshot (admittedly contingent and partial) of the heterogeneous world of present-day
musicology. These include, or make reference to, music analysis, aesthetics, hermeneutics,
interdisciplinary cultural theory, intradisciplinary critical musicology, ethnomusicology,
1 twentieth-century music 1/1 (March 2004), 3–4 (3).
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and even what could be termed ‘post-critical’ inquiry. And authors’ concerns encompass not
only musical and other aesthetic objects but also the subjectivities of listening, interpretation,
and writing.
A receptiveness to difference would seem to go hand-in-hand with the promotion of
pluralism. Hence while the journal’s title is couched in the singular, it none the less seeks to
connote twentieth-century music in the plural (one possible reading of the lower-case
orthography), rather than the art-music canon that, until recently in some quarters, the term
has been assumed more or less exclusively to signify. To the charge that the title should then
have been, more accurately, twentieth-century musics, might come the counter-argument
that the many musical manifestations of the period ought none the less still to be considered
as parts of a historical phenomenon that on some level remains a unity. These are radically
different conceptions of plurality, and here is not the place to arbitrate between them. But it
is to be hoped that over its life the journal will provide a forum for debating issues of exactly
such historiographic (and, as is argued here, political) import.
Aspirations to pluralism also reflect a spirit of inclusiveness that we can see emerging
within parts of the West at its present historical conjuncture, the turn from the twentieth to
the twenty-first century (taking a non-literal view of its own title, the journal also includes the
latter within its purview). But if in some way this could also be seen to connect with
discourses about democracy, we might ask whether its pursuit in the academic sphere will be
as turbulent as its corresponding prosecution within the realm of global politics. By curious
synchronicity, there is discernible within this issue of tcm a ‘contiguity . . . of topics’, as well
as of authors, that establish the UK, the US, ‘old’ Europe, and the theme of globalization as
coordinates within its discursive terrain. Thankfully, the relations of difference here are of a
different order from the tensions of the contemporary international political scene; never-
theless, one corollary of the journal’s inclusivist policy is that it is permeable to polemics that
exercise the discipline as a whole.
Consider the case of Darmstadt, a musical institution that has exerted significant cultural-
critical force, and that has been frequently taken as iconic of musical modernism after the
second world war. For these reasons Darmstadt-school (or Darmstadt-like) composers and
aesthetic principles have also been singled out in subsequent waves of postmodern counter-
criticism, not least within the so-called ‘new musicology’, as proxies for the putative sins of
modernism in general. The screw turns further within these pages, in a counter-counter-
critique that, among other things, criticizes new-musicological critics for their own supposed
shortfalls in self-reflexivity: that is, for their alleged failure to recognize the representational
biases of anglophone accounts of modernism, which they thus perpetuate. Wherever indi-
viduals choose to position themselves within such debates, here is a salutary reminder that
our perceptions of twentieth-century music are shaped by our critical and historiographic
traditions. This, then, is another locus of difference. Your Darmstadt (or your understanding
of modernism) may diverge from mine because of the way accounts have been transmitted to
us; let us not mistake our locally conditioned knowledge for universal truth. To suggest
another example (and risk further polemic), could it not be instructive to consider to what
extent the postmodern turn of the new musicology is a discourse in an American dialect
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(distinct from, say, critical musicology in the UK, and critical theory within Western and
Central Europe), its agenda conditioned by certain local difficulties within the US academy?
To look at matters this way might modify perceptions of the movement without seeking to
undermine its work. On the one hand, this might help loosen the grip of what arguably risks
becoming another kind of hegemony. On the other hand, it might also encourage critics to
give the movement’s protagonists their due – to recognize that their productive challenges to
the discipline have required considerable integrity, and have sometimes been undertaken at
personal cost within the politics of their localities.
All of which should remind us that differences between our musical preferences and
epistemological orientations, including those expressed within this journal, are not arbitrary
or indeterminate, notwithstanding the role of contingency in bringing them together. These
amount to differences in values, in ideology, conditioned by differences in situation. The
music and epistemologies that I value are not a matter of indifference to me, nor yours to you.
But unless (to twist a notion from Habermas) we want to settle for a situation of non-
communicative non-interaction, we should equally not be indifferent to one another; and it
is here that the will to universalize starts to creep back in, with as much potential for conflict
as for consensus. For what I find valuable in my musical understanding is so precisely because
I perceive this as not reducible to my self – in other words, as not only subjective. But, given
that the same also goes for you, our respective projections of our values and beliefs back out
into the social world may be jarringly non-congruent.
Given the contemporary proliferation of musics and ideas, how do we deal with the
pluralism of our times – with its anxieties as well as its vibrancy? Rhetorically (i.e. with
an awareness of the artificiality of binarisms), we might contrast two possible models,
which, not coincidentally, resonate with corresponding political theorizations of cultural
difference.2
One model available to us is that of liberal pluralism and its associated principle of value
pluralism. This is a polity which, in William A. Galston’s analysis, ‘will organize itself around
the principle of maximum feasible accommodation of diverse legitimate ways of life, limited
only by the minimum requirements of civic unity. This principle expresses (and requires) the
practice of tolerance – the conscientious reluctance to act in ways that impede others from
living in accordance with their various conceptions of what gives life meaning and worth.’3
While Galston’s account itself does not explore how musical or academic engagement would
function under such a principle, it is not too difficult to see how these instances of what
liberals call ‘expressive liberty’ could be couched: in short, we are each free to practise and
value whichever musics we choose, and, if it pleases us, to discourse about them under
whatever value system we choose, provided we do not violate civic or (by analogy) institu-
tional unity. Under such a regime, holders of differing aesthetic or intellectual mores may
recognize each others’ existence, may enter into dialogue with one another, or may co-exist
2 Perhaps no less coincidentally, this construction also echoes conclusions drawn by Kevin Korsyn in his recent book,
Decentering Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); see especially chapter 8 (176–88).
3 William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: the Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 119.
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in disagreement or disapproval, provided each party abides by a minimal social or institu-
tional understanding not to violate, or limit the freedom of expression of, any other, to whom
the same conditions apply. (In some ways this suggests a kind of background neutrality that
is possibly also implicit in Mark and Moore’s image of a ‘contiguity of divergent topics’.)
This blueprint necessarily has no positive epistemological foundation, for the very act of
theorizing one would be to privilege a particular form of discourse (Reason) – and so run
counter to the very principles that define value pluralism. The characteristics of this polity,
then, are those of pragmatism. The question is whether such a philosophy offers sufficient
theoretical support or depth (the latter a conceit which liberal philosophers such as Richard
Rorty might of course reject as metaphysical) to bear the weight of fraught epistemological
complexity that a pluralist ethic brings.
An alternative model for dealing with difference is offered by theories of radical democ-
racy, whose most notable exponents include Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Slavoj
Žižek. Given earlier comments, it is worth noting the different cultural and intellectual
pedigrees of these models: the one anglophone (or, more precisely, British/North Atlantic),
the liberal traditions of, for example, Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls; the other more rooted in
continental European traditions. If the disposition of liberal pluralism is characterized by
tolerance, its counterpart in radical democracy is antagonism, or more precisely, agonism –
which, among other things, brings the notion of adverseriality out from under the carpet of
democratic values. Mouffe offers one of the more straightforward expositions of these ideas
in her book The Democratic Paradox, where she asserts: ‘One of the keys to the thesis of
agonistic pluralism is that, far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic confrontation is in
fact its very condition of existence. Modern democracy’s specificity lies in the recognition
and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian
order.’4
This model, then, eschews notions of harmoniousness, and instead embraces abrasive
encounters as inevitable, even desirable. Whereas liberal pluralists ultimately take their
premises as a pragmatic given, and hence leave them theoretically underdetermined, propo-
nents of radical democracy seem to incline toward theoretical overdetermination.5 This may
well be because their ideas are explicitly founded on an impossibility, namely that of
representing society as a totality. As Mouffe puts it: ‘the democratic character of society can
only be given by the fact that no limited social actor can attribute to herself or himself the
representation of the totality and claim to have the ‘‘mastery’’ of the foundation’.6 (Applied
to our own context, this might be read as the impossibility of representing the totality of the
many different musics we encounter in our contemporary culture as an integrated social
whole.) If such realizations are uncomfortable, their apologists see them as none the less
constitutive of democracy.
4 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 103.
5 Compare, for example, the tenor of Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), with the Hegelian and Lacanian terms of reference found in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj
Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London and New York: Verso,
2000).
6 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 100.
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This is not the occasion to foreclose discussion as to which of these models offers the more
useful way forward, nor to rule out the possibility of, and need for, alternatives. But what is
worth noting is that these ways of thinking through the apparent intractabilities of difference
in the aesthetic and epistemological sphere are of a piece with approaches in the wider
political sphere; the connection is more than metaphorical. Of course, the fact that, in
contrast to the domain of international politics, there is no corresponding likelihood of
actual blood on the floor (at worst this may be only of the metaphorical variety) might make
these issues seem no more important than armchair speculations. On the other hand, there
is the faint hope that by publicly negotiating frameworks for pluralism and difference within
our symbolic practices, we might also gain insights that are not wholly irrelevant to wider
cultural and political a(nta)gonisms. Here, then, we might glimpse ways in which to be
academic is to be far from academic.
David Clarke
Issue editor
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